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This study investigates the impact of corporate bonds issued by Greek listed firms on 
employment. Even though external financing and the effects on employment has been 
studied in the literature, we extend the existing literature by focusing for the first time on 
the specific role of corporate bonds on employment. Our empirical analysis is based on a 
panel dataset from 2001 to 2014 and we examine the effect of corporate bonds in the pre 
and post period of the Greek economic crisis, in which the banking system is vulnerable 
and unable to provide financing to the firms. The results suggest that corporate bonds have 
a positive effect on employment in the pre-crisis sample, denoting that firms hire 
employees and proceed to investment choices. On the contrary, during the recession, 
corporate bonds have a negative effect on employment. Firms reduce their costs and try to 
control their debt obligations by issuing corporate bonds.  
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1    Introduction 
The paper contributes to the empirical literature understanding corporate debt and its effect on 
employment. Although external financing became considerably popular in recent years with a 
number of studies that look at the relationship among employment, external financing, leverage, 
size and other factors, corporate bonds have received little attention in the academic literature. 
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We go one step further and we examine for the first time their effect on employment during 
poor domestic economic conditions.  
The recent financial crisis highlights the importance of understanding how financial market 
conditions impact the real economy. After 2008, when the global economic crisis started, 
European firms had unsustainable debt and corporate investments declined sharply. The largest 
falls incurred in the E.U. periphery like Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, while Germany, Netherlands and Austria remained almost unaffected. Greece was 
hit hard by the recession, which affected companies in a negative manner to borrow funds from 
the banking system and that had an impact on their operational behavior due to increased 
financial pressure. In that period, the financial distress of Greek firms was in the highest levels 
and financial institutions couldn’t provide funding into the real economy, because they had 
been under pressure to shrink their balance sheets (high-risk exposure on their portfolios of 
Non-Performing Loans), while at the same time the deleveraging of the Greek economy 
continued. Until the complete restoration of Greek banks to their market-making role, firms had 
an access to alternative, more diverse source of funding “corporate bonds”, that could use the 
proceeds from bond sales to invest in growth and job creation. Therefore, this study deals with 
an interesting case study of an economy entering a financial crisis and as such it could help us 
understand corporate behavior in such conditions. 
The rest of our study is arranged as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 
3 presents the sources of the collected datasets; Section 4 introduces the methodological 
approach; Section 5 presents and discuss the empirical findings; Section 6 presents the 
robustness analysis; Section 7 concludes the main insights of our paper and provide some 
remarks. 
2    Background and Related Studies 
Firms frequently make decisions about the composition of their capital structure. The first who 
examined this issue were Modigliani and Miller (1958). They formed the basis for modern 
thinking on capital structure. Under specific assumptions a firm is unaffected by how that firm 
is financed. When the interest on debt is tax deductible, and ignoring other frictions, the value 
of the company increases in proportion to the amount of debt used, so firms prefer to issue debt 
instead of equity.  
Divergences from this study, described by Donaldson (1963), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers (1977), Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Fama and French (2002) have 
emphasized the role of informational asymmetries and agency costs that differentiate the cost 
of external and internal financing, making capital structure choice important for the firm's value 
and for the cost of capital available to the firm. This has implications for the real side activity 
of the firm such as employment and investment in inventories. 
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An alternative theory was developed by Myers (1977) regarding the optimal level of debt 
financing, which is related to the types of assets in their portfolio (growth or equity assets). 
Firm’s investment decisions are distorted if creditors capture large part of investment’s cash-
flows. Firms with risky debt will follow a different investment rule than those that issue equity. 
The decisions of firms to increase their capital either by external financing (issue debt by loan, 
corporate bond or commercial paper) or by internal financing (capitalize profits or issue new 
shares) is related to their needs to finance their development program, equipment, specific 
projects, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), research and development (R&D), infrastructure, 
establishment or improvement of production lines, new products and services, ongoing 
operations or even working capital. Therefore, employment is a crucial parameter connected to 
the operation of firms, so they can generate profits. The objective of business is profitability 
and every organization's success depend on its employees' performance. 
In the late 80s, the financial distress effects of firms were associated with high leverage. 
However, implications for employment have received little attention. Cantor (1990) studied the 
effects of leverage on corporate investment and hiring decisions, by using simple econometric 
models in which the dependent variables are firms’ investment and firms’ employment growth; 
the independent variables are current sales, lagged values of sales up to three years and cash-
flows. He showed that the effect on employment is more positively correlated with cash flows 
at more highly leveraged firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) found that sales increase, 
inventories and bank debt of small manufacturing companies are more sensitive to monetary 
policy shocks than that of larger companies. In addition, the results suggest that smaller firms 
have more procyclical employment policies, even after controlling for the greater cyclicality of 
firms’ sales. A statistically significant relationship between firm’s financial leverage and 
employment in the manufacturing sector of US was analyzed by Sharpe (1994) for the period 
1959-1985. High leveraged firms tend to lay-off workers, obviously consistent with liquidity 
constraints. 
Hiring of new employees is linked to investment choices and since investment is partly 
driven by access to finance, employment growth should be partially dependent on external 
financing. Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) studied the impact on company behavior of increases 
in financial pressure and they used three measures of long-term financial constraints: number 
of employees, dividend payout relative to assets and debt to capital ratio. They suggest that the 
ratio of interest payment to cash flow is the best measure and when this ratio increases denotes 
large negative impact on employment and pay rises, but small positive effect on productivity. 
Heisz and LaRochelle-Cote (2004) investigated the relationship between financial structure and 
employment growth, as well as investment growth in the Canadian market in 1988-1997. Firms 
that are financially vulnerable, such as small firms or firms with high leverage, they reduce 
their labor force more than healthier firms. Especially, during the recession in the 1990-1992 
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period, the impact was even larger. In the Spanish market, Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal 
(2008) showed similar results during the 1985-2001 period, based on financial firm-level data 
and their impact on investment and employment decisions. When the financial pressure of firms 
increases, then there is a large negative effect on employment. Caggese and Cunat (2008) 
examined the link between financing constraints of Italian firms and their employment 
decisions. These firms use fixed-term employees more often when they are under financial 
pressure, avoiding high firing costs. Pagano and Pica (2012) tested a model on international 
industry-level data for the period 1970-2003, which predicts that financial development allows 
firms to increase their use of both capital and labor (employment, wages). 
Regarding young and small firms, they experienced a relatively larger decline in net 
employment growth compared with large firms during the 2007-2009 financial crisis according 
to Fort et al. (2013). A very interesting approach on the access to external financing and the 
link to firms’ growth is presented by European Commission (2014). A number of channels have 
been examined to explore the link between financial constraints and employment, by using a 
labor demand equation augmented with firm financial characteristics for several E.U. states and 
industries. On average, this report suggest that long-term credit flows have a significant and 
positive correlation with employment demand. The real effects of access to finance were 
studied by McLean and Zhao (2014). They showed that both investment and employment are 
less sensitive to Tobin’s q and more sensitive to cash flow during recessions and periods of low 
investor sentiment. In addition, between share and debt issuance, the authors argue that both 
play roles in causing these effects, although that share issuance plays a bigger role.  
Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) linked credit constraints to unemployment during the 2007–
2009 U.S. financial crisis. They showed that the employees of small firms in industries with 
high external financial dependence are more likely to become unemployed during the recession. 
Giroud and Mueller (2017) using micro-level data showed that firms with high leverage suffer 
significantly higher employment losses in response to declines in local consumer demand. 
Baurle et al. (2017) used a sample of Swiss firms (financial firms and utilities excluded) with 
firm-level data, in order to investigate the role of financial constraints in employment 
adjustment. Firms with difficulty to access external funding resize their labor force more 
strongly than firms that have access to abundant funds, when output decreases. In contrast, 
financially constrained firms increase their employment more strongly when output increases. 
There are also some other studies that examine from another perspective the effects on 
employment, such as Wadhwani (1987) who investigated the impact of inflation on 
employment. He showed that higher inflation may be substantially decrease employment. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) estimated a model of employment, based on a sample of 200 
U.K. firms, where unions and firms bargain over wages. The results suggest that employment 
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is negatively related to the firm's own wage and the change in the own wage relative to outside 
opportunities. The impact of labor protection on corporate debt maturity structures was 
investigated by Belkhir et al. (2016) in 43 countries for the period 1990-2010. They found that 
in countries, in which labor force is highly protected through state’s legislation, firms tend to 
borrow more short-term. In view of the above, we have collected all the relevant papers on this 
line of the literature and concisely report them in a table format and then use them in analyzing 
our results (Table 1). 
In general, the industry of corporate bonds in U.S. and E.U. has grown strongly in recent 
years. The remarkable growth in debt capital markets points to a structural change in corporate 
financing according to Kaya and Meyer (2013). Since the availability of bank lending has been 
shrinking especially in the periphery of the E.U. area and due to the high impact of the recession, 
firms are increasingly turning to debt capital markets. Uuskula (2016) pointed out that “very 
high levels of debt are considered to obstruct growth because of debt overhang and the 
possibility of debt deflation. In addition to the problems of excessive debt levels, levels of debt 
being too low might be a sign of weakness in the financial sector or poor financing conditions 
for firms”. Moreover, investors are looking for higher returns, since treasury bonds are offering 
historically low yields. In 2016 American equity issuance amounted to just under $200bn, while 
the total of corporate bonds reached $1.5trn and has risen by half over the past five years. 
Similarly, in E.U. area, there have been €345bn of non-financial corporate bonds issued in euros 
in 2016 and the total amount was less than half back to 2007. Even European Central Bank 
(ECB) has been buying corporate bonds since 2016, and now holds more than €120bn compared 
to €1.8trn of government bonds. It is not buying unsecured bank bonds, but holds close to 
€250bn of covered bonds.  
In Greece, corporate bonds issued by non-financial firms worth €7bn over the last five years 
in the Athens Stock Exchange or in international markets. Large corporations and banks have 
already tapped the international debt markets in 2013 and 2014 (Table 2). The total amount of 
issued corporate bonds in these years of all listed firms including banks was €7.725bn. There 
was a massive increase of corporate debt in the first three quarters of 2014 (€4.875bn) compared 
to 2013 (€2.850bn), indicating somehow, the need of firms to access funding for their 
development strategies. Furthermore, firms with a high reputation abroad can raise large 
amounts of funds by issuing global bonds instead of domestic bonds. According to 
Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2008) firms also tend to issue global bonds when the domestic 
economy is weak. Sometimes, the balance-sheet of a corporation contains better results than 
the balance-sheet of a state and investors trust the numbers. 
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Table 1. Most Important Studies on the Effects of Several Factors on Employment 
Dependent Independent Study 
Log of employment 
Lagged 
employment 
terms 
Lagged real 
wages 
Relative 
raw 
materials 
price Competitiveness
Fiscal 
stance
World 
income D/E ratio 
Nominal 
interest rate 
Wadhwani 
(1987)
Volatility of 
firms' 
investment 
rates 
Volatility of 
firms' 
employment 
growth rates Firm size Average growth rates Sales volatility Cash flow volatility Cantor (1990)
Employment growth rate 
[Leverage(t-2)+Size(t-2)]* 
Future expected sales 
growth(t+1) 
[Leverage(t-2)+Size(t-2)]* 
Future expected sales 
growth(t) Leverage (t-2) Size (t-2) Sharpe (1994)
Actual employment Employment lagged values Log of capital
Log of 
wage
Log of 
prices
Ratio of debt to 
& collateralizeable' net 
worth 
Nickell & 
Nicolitsas (1999)
Employment % change 
Employment 
% change 
(t-1) 
Average % 
change in 
sales over 
the last 2 
years 
Leverage 
and lagged 
values
Size and lagged 
values
Leverage on 
employment 
elasticity
Conditioning influence 
of size on employment 
elasticity 
 
Heisz, A. & 
LaRochelle-Cote 
(2004)
Fixed-term / 
Permanent 
contract Employment Fixed capital 
Log standard deviation of 
sales Growth assets Small firms 
Caggese & Cunat
(2008)
Employment growth Industry’s share 
External dependence * stock 
market capitalization
External dependence * claims 
of banks and other financial 
instruments
Pagano & Pica 
(2012)
Employment growth 
Tobin’s q  (t-
1) Cash flow Expansion Industrial production Sentiment CSI
Interactive 
terms 
McLean & Zhao 
(2014)
Natural logarithm of 
employees  
Lagged 
employment 
(t-1) 
Lagged 
employment 
(t-2) 
Log of 
tangible 
fixed 
capital
Change in the 
log of the 
average firm 
wage
Lagged 
level of 
average 
real wage
Change in 
log of 
output
F(1), F(2) 
Financial 
vectors 
Z vector  
(firm size, 
age, stock 
market 
status) 
 
European 
Commission 
(2014)
Employed or Unemployed 
compared to previous year 
Industry-state fixed effects 
(probability of switching 
from employment to 
unemployment) 
X vector: controls for 
workers’ observable 
differences in 
age, gender, ethnicity, and 
years of completed 
education
Recession 
periods 
(Dummy)
Small firm (<100 
Employees)
Recession * 
small firm 
 
Burcu Duygan-
Bump et al. 
(2015)
Debt Maturity 
  
Fraser 
Institute's 
Labor 
Market 
Regulation 
Index 
Measure of 
labor 
protection 
regulation Leverage Size
Market-
to-Book 
ratio
Asset 
tangibility 
ratio
Asset 
maturity 
Inflation 
and others 
variables 
 
Belkhir et al. 
(2016)
% change in establishment-
level employment Percentage change in house prices Level of firm leverage Interaction term 
Giroud & 
Mueller (2017)
Log change 
in employment 
Log change 
in lagged 
employment 
Log change 
in output 
(value 
added) 
Average 
wage
Log change 
in output (value added) * 
Lagged External financial 
constraints
Log change 
in output (value 
added) * 
Lagged Internal 
financial 
constraints
Other 
various 
explanatory 
variables 
 
Baurle et al. 
(2017)
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Table 2. Corporate Bonds of Listed Greek Firms Issued in Domestic and International 
Markets in 2013 and 2014 
 
Corporation Announcement Date Maturity 
Amount Issued 
(Eur Mil) Coupon
Coupon 
Type 
Coupon 
Frequency Rating
2013 
Coca-Cola Jun 2013 Jun 2020 800 2,375 Fixed Annual BBB 
Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
Organisation 
Jan 2013 Feb 2018 700 7,875 Fixed Semi-Annual BB- 
Hellenic Petroleum Apr 2013 May 2017 500 8,000 Fixed Semi-Annual -- 
Intralot Aug 2013 Aug 2018 325 9,750 Fixed Semi-Annual B+ 
SB Minerals Jul 2013 Aug 2020 275 9,250 Fixed Semi-Annual B+ 
Frigoglass May 2014 May 2018 250 8,250 Fixed Semi-Annual BB- 
Total Amount Issued  2,850  
2014 
Public Power Corporation Apr 2014 May 2019 500 5,500 Fixed Semi-Annual B 
Public Power Corporation Apr 2014 May 2017 200 4,750 Fixed Semi-Annual B 
Intralot Apr 2014 May 2021 250 6,000 Fixed Semi-Annual B+ 
Motor Oil May 2014 May 2019 350 5,125 Fixed Semi-Annual -- 
Titan Jul 2014 Jul 2019 300 4,250 Fixed Semi-Annual BB 
Hellenic Petroleum Jun 2014 Jul 2019 325 5,250 Fixed Semi-Annual -- 
Hellenic 
Telecommunications 
Organisation 
Jul 2014 Jul 2020 700 3,500 Fixed Annual BB- 
Piraeus Bank Mar 2014 Mar 2017 500 5,000 Fixed Annual CCC+
National Bank of Greece Apr 2014 Apr 2019 750 4,375 Fixed Annual CCC+
Alpha Bank Jun 2014 Jun 2017 500 3,375 Fixed Annual CCC+
Eurobank Jul 2014 Jun 2018 500 4,250 Fixed Annual CCC+
Total Amount Issued  4,875  
Source: Piraeus Bank Research 
However, despite their importance as a source of financing, the corporate-bond market is still 
archaic and often a transaction requires a phone call to a trading desk at an investment bank and 
the processes are very slow. Even though they offer new investment opportunities for savers, 
basic price data is difficult to be reached, while at the same time other financial commodities 
like stocks, futures or options can be traded at the click of a button. This method of trading still 
accounts for the majority of corporate bonds worldwide.  
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Figure 1. Non-Financial Corporations Reporting Difficulty in Getting Bank Loans 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank 
The recession in the E.U. hit hard the southern member states. According to Eurostat, that 
caused a sharp fall in the proportion of successful bank loan applications of firms (Figure 1 
above). The lack of diversification in financing made firms to be highly depended on bank 
financing. Thus, credit markets play a very important role. 
We must mention though that the majority of corporate bonds that are issued by private or 
public companies are traded over-the-counter (OTC) rather than stock exchanges. However, 
what we actually examine in this paper is the role of the Greek debt capital markets to drive 
growth that bridging the funding gap through bond markets in a period where firms need more 
the ever capital for their investments. Douglas (1991) examined when a debt contract will be 
monitored by lenders. Firms may choose either to borrow funds directly from the capital 
markets (issue a corporate bond or a commercial paper without monitoring), or to borrow from 
a financial institution that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. The results suggest that middle-
rated firms rely on monitored bank loans. They will start building their reputation by being 
monitored and later they can issue publicly traded bonds. On the other hand, high credit rated 
firms have a lower cost of capital, and such a rating needs to be maintained to retain this source 
of higher present value of future profits. We must also note that a corporate bond is an 
alternative form of funding, a type of loan that is issued by the borrower (the firm) not through 
banking intermediation, but through the capital markets, ensuring medium-term and long-term 
capital, flexibility and security. Bonds allow the issuer to finance long-term investments with 
external funds. However, bank debt pay downs are the most frequent reason firms issue junk 
(high yield) bonds in order to maintain financial flexibility.  
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3    Data Description 
The datasets which we use in order to investigate the impact of corporate bonds on employment 
covers the period from 2001 to 2014, which we split in one of our models in the pre-crisis 
period (2001-2010) and the post-crisis period (2010-2014). The reason we have chosen 2010 
as the year of change is due to the fact that the Greek government signed the first memorandum 
(or first bailout program) with E.U. member states and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
asking for €110bn financial assistance (€80bn from EU and €30bn from IMF) in order to cope 
with the government-debt crisis. The dataset is collected from three different sources: (i) 
financial firm characteristics of 294 listed Greek firms from WRDS Compustat Global, (ii) 217 
issued corporate bonds (Greek financial institutions are not included) from Athens Stock 
Exchange and, (iii) 527 corporate bonds issued by Greek financial institutions from Bloomberg. 
From the last two datasets, we exclude corporate bonds issued in other currencies than EUR 
(e.g. USD, GBP, JPY, CHF), which do not affect the purpose of our study. Our final sample 
consists of 45 firms over 294 that issued one or more corporate bonds that period. The total 
number of corporate bonds that are issued in EUR currency are 706. 
4    Methodology and Variables 
We explore several models to illustrate how the need for external financing of a firm affects the 
link between corporate bond issuance and the firm's job creation. To examine this relation, we 
use the following sets of yearly-measured variables. Consistent with prior research (European 
Commission, 2014), we measure the dependent variable employment (EMPL) as the number 
of employees of the firm i at time t and we test four different models by running simple panel 
regressions with fixed effects. On the right-side variables, we control for firm-level variables 
that are known to be linked with firm growth and a new variable that controls for the amount 
of corporate bond. The characteristics of the independent variables are: a measure of company’s 
size is the amount of Total Assets of the firm i at time t, a measure of leverage (LEV), which is 
the ratio of Long-Term Debt (LDEBT) over Total Assets (TA) of the firm i at time t; a measure 
of investment (INV), which is the ratio [(TAt + TAt-1) / TAt-1] of each firm i at time t; the 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) of firm i at time t is an indicator of a company's 
profitability, calculated as revenues minus expenses excluding taxes and interest and it is 
watched closely by creditors, since it represents the amount of cash that a company will be able 
to use to pay off creditors. It shows how financial vulnerable the firms are; Capital Expenditure 
(CAPEX) it is an indicator of company’s funds that are used to acquire, upgrade and maintain 
physical assets such as equipment, property, buildings, factory, technology, etc. and it is any 
type of expense that a company capitalizes; Pretax Earnings (PRETAX) is a company's income 
after all operating expenses, including interest and depreciation, have been deducted from total 
sales or revenues, but before income taxes have been subtracted. Because pretax earnings 
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exclude taxes, this measure enables the intrinsic profitability of companies to be compared 
across industries or geographic regions where corporate taxes differ; Corporate Bond (BOND) 
is the amount of the issued bond in euros in year t by firm i. Therefore, in order to understand 
any of the estimation results relating to the impact of corporate bonds on employment, one must 
be clear about the simplest econometric specification and which parameters we seek to identify 
in the model. As a baseline reference, we begin with the most basic dynamic model and develop 
it. 
EMPLt=f(INV,SIZE,LEV, Financial Factors, BOND)t 
In model 1, in which all firms are included, the dependent variable is the first difference of the 
logarithm (dlog) of employment and the regressors are as follows: investments, which are the 
investments that took place the same year as the issuance of the bond; the logarithm of total 
assets; the logarithm of leverage; the logarithm of pretax earnings and the logarithm of 
corporate bond. 
dlog(EMPL)i,t = b0 + b1INVi,t + b2log(TA)i,t + b3log(LEV)i,t + 
b4log(PRETAX_EARN)i,t + b5log(BOND)t + e i,t                             (1) 
In model 2, consistent with prior literature, we exclude from our dataset financial institutions 
and utilities. Fama and French (1992) state that a usual common practice in research is to 
exclude financial firms because the high leverage that is normal for these firms probably does 
not have the same meaning as for the non-financial firms, where high leverage more likely 
denotes financial distress. In other words, it might dominate our sample. Utilities are excluded 
because they operate under state regulations and rules. The dependent variable is similarly the 
growth of the employment and the regressors are as follows: investments; logarithm of capital 
expenditures; logarithm of leverage; logarithm of corporate bond.  
 
dlog(EMPL)i,t = b0 + b1INVi,t + b2log(CAPEX)i,t + b3log(LEV)i,t + b4log(BOND)t + e i,t      
(2) 
We regress model 3 twice; In the first regression (model 3a), our sample contains all firms and 
in the second regression (model 3b), financial institutions and utilities are excluded. The 
dependent variable is the change rate of employment and the right-hand side variables are: the 
change rate of long-term debt; the change rate of total assets; the change rate of earnings before 
interest and taxes, to control for the fact that firms which had profits/loses in past periods, may 
also be likely to do so in the current period; and the logarithm of the corporate bond. 
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dlog(EMPL)i,t = b0 + b1dlog(LDEBT)i,t + b2dlog(TA)i,t + 
b3dlog(EBIT)i,t + b4log(BOND)i,t + e i,t   (3a, 3b)                                        
5    Empirical Results 
First of all, it is worth examining the variability of the Greek GDP to have a view of the Greek 
Economy (Figure 2), which declined by almost -26,6% since the 2008 high and -21,44%, since 
the first bailout program. 
Figure 2. Greek GDP 2001-2014 (in billion EUR, constant prices) 
 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (The data for has been revised with 2010 as 
benchmark year, according to Regulation EC 549/2013 of European Commission, ESA 
2010) 
 
According to Table 3 below, we present the estimates of the panel regression of model 1. It 
seems that corporate bonds have a small negative effect on employment (all period & pre-
crisis). Investments have a positive effect as expected in all cases, while leverage has a positive 
effect in all period and pre-crisis samples and a negative effect in the recession, in line with the 
literature. Also, size has a negative effect (all period & pre-crisis). The larger the company, it 
doesn’t mean that hires more employees. Pretax earnings have a positive effect (all period & 
pre-crisis). The values of the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, that tests for first-order (lag one) 
autocorrelation in the residuals denotes that the error terms are non-autocorrelated and our 
estimation is significant, while R2 is quite satisfactory. 
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Table 3. Model 1 Panel Regression, All Firms 
Dependent:  
DLog 
(Employment) ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Investments 0.185 0.000*** 0.173 0.001*** 0.302 0.043** 
Log (Total Assets) -0.014 0.050** -0.035 0.001*** 0.004 0.544 
Log (Leverage) 0.008 0.060* 0.017 0.000*** -0.040 0.002*** 
Log (Pretax 
Earnings) 0.027 0.007*** 0.040 0.004*** 0.004 0.644 
Log (Bond) -0.015 0.004*** -0.017 0.022** 0.003 0.571 
 R2=0.49 DW=1.90 R2=0.81 DW=2.30 R2=0.82 DW=2.15 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The heteroscedasticity of the error terms is corrected 
by using White robust standard errors. 
In Table 4, we exclude financial institutions and utilities as suggested in the literature. 
Corporate bonds have a negative effect on employment in all period and post-crisis samples. It 
is a valuable information for our research though that corporate bonds have negative effect on 
employment in the post-crisis period. Actually, this result indicates that after the issuance of 
the corporate bond, firms don’t hire more employees to implement their projects, but rather 
they handle their debt obligations during the Greek economic crisis. The sign though is positive 
in the pre-crisis period, even though it is not significant. DW and R2 values are quite sufficient 
in this case. Investments have nearly a borderline negative effect (all period and post crisis) 
indicating that firms didn’t hire employees in the recession in order to implement their projects. 
Leverage has a negative effect in pre-crisis sample and positive effect in the post crisis sample. 
Capital expenditure has a positive effect in all periods, which seems normal.  
Table 4. Model 2 Panel Regression, Financial Institutions and Utilities Excluded 
Dependent:  
DLog 
(Employment) ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Investments 0.231 0.000*** 0.233 0.006*** 0.095 0.000*** 
Log (CapEx) -0.012 0.008*** -0.019 0.248 -0.018 0.001*** 
Log (Leverage) -0.016 0.313 -0.094 0.010 0.065 0.000*** 
Log (Bond) -0.001 0.748 0.022 0.182 -0.028 0.000*** 
 R2=0.53 DW=2.48 R2=0.63 DW=3.53 R2=0.91 DW=1.92 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The heteroscedasticity of the error terms is corrected 
by using White robust standard errors. 
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However, DW is high in the pre-crisis sample. Thus, there is statistical evidence that the error 
terms are negatively autocorrelated suggesting that there is information that has not been 
accounted for in the model, which can lead to underestimates of the standard error and can 
cause a researcher to think predictors are significant when they are not. 
According to Table 5, where all firms are included, the results suggest that corporate bonds 
have a small negative effect on employment in all samples. Growth rate of total assets 
(investments) has the usual positive effect in all samples and growth rate of long-term debt has 
a positive effect in all period and pre-crisis samples, while it is negative in the recession which 
supports literature’s findings. Growth rate of earnings before interest and taxes has a negative 
effect on employment in all samples. DW and R2 values are adequate. 
In Table 6, we ran the test again as before by excluding financial institutions and utilities.  
Table 5. Model 3a Panel Regression, All Firms 
Dependent: 
DLog (Employment) ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
DLog (Long-Term 
Debt) 0.015 0.002*** 0.013 0.017** -0.024 0.004*** 
DLog (Total Assets) 0.502 0.000*** 0.431 0.002*** 0.544 0.000*** 
DLog (Ebit) -0.042 0.000*** -0.035 0.260 -0.031 0.003*** 
Log (Bond) -0.010 0.008*** -0.013 0.026** -0.007 0.039** 
 R2=0.74 DW=2.34 R2=0.86 DW=2.14 R2=0.86 DW=2.79 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The heteroscedasticity of the error terms is corrected 
by using White robust standard errors. 
Table 6. Model 3b Panel Regression, Financial Institutions and Utilities Excluded 
Dependent: 
DLog (Employment) ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
DLog (Long-Term 
Debt) 0.018 0.011** 0.039 0.000*** -0.038 0.354 
DLog (Total Assets) 0.723 0.000*** 1.050 0.000*** 0.115 0.078* 
DLog (Ebit) -0.054 0.000*** -0.255 0.001*** -0.051 0.000*** 
Log (Bond) -0.012 0.023** 0.104 0.000*** -0.011 0.024** 
 R2=0.77 DW=2.71 R2=0.99 DW=1.73 R2=0.92 DW=2.68 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The heteroscedasticity of the error terms is corrected 
by using White robust standard errors. 
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The issuance of a corporate bond has a negative effect in all period sample, but most importantly 
it is positive and statistically significant in the pre-crisis period and negative in the Greek 
economic crisis, supporting further the findings in model 2. The results indicate that firms tend 
to hire more employees and proceed to their investment plans before the crisis, while on the 
contrary they handle their debt obligations during the recession and reduce their operational 
costs. The growth rate of total assets (investments) is again statistically significant in all 
samples. Similarly, growth rate of long-term debt has nearly a positive effect in all period and 
pre-crisis samples. The sign though is negative in the recession but non-significant. The growth 
rate of earnings before interest and taxes has surprisingly a negative effect on employment in 
all samples, with a higher impact in the pre-crisis period. An explanation is that even if some 
of the Greek firms might have earnings, they try to reduce their operational costs and keep them 
in low levels in order to have the appropriate cash flow to survive (pay suppliers, loans, taxes 
etc.) in the recession or to share dividends, proceed to investments or acquisitions in the pre-
crisis period, but definitely they don’t use their earnings to hire more staff. 
6    Robustness Analysis 
6.1    Model Selection Criteria – J-Tests 
We will use in our study the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) developed by Akaike (1974) 
and J-tests developed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) in order to compare non-nested 
models. 
AIC is an estimated measure for selecting among econometric models. It actually tests how 
well each model fits the dataset without over-fitting it. AIC essentially estimates the quality of 
each model, as they relate to one another for a certain set of data, making it an ideal method for 
model selection. It embodies the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) and some penalty for the loss 
of degrees of freedom for adding to many variables. The AIC is given by the following formula, 
where K is the number of parameters and N the number of observations: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = ቀଶ௄ே ቁ + 𝑙𝑛 ቀ
ோௌௌ
ே ቁ                                              (4) 
Gujarati (2004) mentioned that AIC is useful for both nested and non-nested models. When we 
compare two or more models, the lowest value of AIC is preferred.  
Regarding J-tests consider the following two competing models: 
𝐻ଵ; 𝑦 = 𝑋ଵ𝑏ଵ + 𝑒ଵ 
𝐻ଶ; 𝑦 = 𝑋ଶ𝑏ଶ + 𝑒ଶ 
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These models are non-nested because the regressors under one model are not a subset of the 
other model, even though 𝑋ଵand 𝑋ଶ may share some common variables. The idea of the J-test 
is that if one model is the correct model, then the fitted values from the other model should not 
have explanatory power when re-estimating that model. In other words, if the first model 
contains the correct set of regressors, then including the fitted values of the second model into 
the set of regressors should provide no significant improvement. But if it does, it can be 
concluded that the first does not contain the correct set of regressors. The J-test statistic is 
simply the marginal test of the fitted values in the augmented model. 
We must mention that it might be possible either to reject hypothesis in both cases, against 
the alternatives, which means that we must look for a better model for the data or it might be 
also possible to fail to reject both models, suggesting that the data do not provide enough 
information to discriminate between the two models. 
Alternatively, we can artificially nest the two models: 
𝐻ଷ; 𝑦 = 𝑋ଵ𝑏ଵ + 𝑋ଶ∗𝑏ଶ∗ + 𝑒ଷ 
Where 𝑋ଶ∗ excludes from 𝑋ଶ the common variables with 𝑋ଵ. A test for 𝐻ଵ is simply the F-test 
for 𝐻଴; 𝑏ଶ∗ = 0. 
Therefore, in our study we perform J-tests in order to compare models 1 and 3a (all firms 
included) and models 2 and 3b (financial firms and utilities are excluded). In case that we cannot 
conclude through the tests, we will consider the AIC value (Table 7). 
Comparing models 1 and 3a, the results overall suggest that model 3a is preferred. The fitted 
values from 1 are not significant to 3a in all three samples, while the fitted values of 3a enter 
significantly in 1 in all period and pre-crisis samples. In the post-crisis sample that is non-
significant, the AIC shows that model 1 is preferred. 
Table 7. J-Tests and Akaike criterion for non-nested models 
 ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Fitted 1 (to Model 3a) -0.556 0.185 -0.724 0.140 0.004 0.985 
Fitted 3a (to Model 1) 2,448 0.000*** 2,985 0.000 *** 1,311 0.160 
 AIC 1 = -3.985 AIC 1 = -3.891 AIC 1 = -5.192 
 AIC 3a = -4.442 AIC 3a = -4.141 AIC 3a = -5.140 
 ALL PERIOD PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Fitted 2 (to Model 3b) 0.481 0.308 -0.427 0.000*** 1,061 0.110 
Fitted 3b (to Model 2) 0.723 0.000*** 0.941 0.004*** -0.044 0.604 
 AIC 2 = -3.755 AIC 2 = -3.449 AIC 2 = -4.410 
 AIC 3b = -4.221 AIC 3b = -5.578 AIC 3b = -5.036 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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Comparing models 2 and 3b, the fitted values from 2 are not significant to 3b in all period and 
post-crisis samples. The fitted values of 3b enter significantly in 2 in all period and pre- 
crisis samples. It seems that according to J-tests, model 3b is preferred and AIC 3b supports the 
results. However, we must repeat that the literature clearly states that findings are more 
meaningful when financial institutions and utilities are excluded from our samples. 
6.2  Addressing Heterogeneity and Endogeneity Using IV 
We deal with heterogeneity and endogeneity issues through instrumental variables (IV) 
techniques, in order to support further our findings (Table 8). 
In accordance with our previous results, corporate bonds have a negative effect on 
employment in the all period sample, either we use all firms or exclude financial firms and 
utilities from our dataset. Moreover, it is statistically significant in model 2. Investments are 
positive and significant again as expected, while leverage and long-term debt have a positive 
impact on employment, similarly with our previous findings. Therefore, we demonstrated 
robustness checks and reported alternative specifications to test the same hypothesis, which 
conclude that our main analysis is valid. 
Table 8: GMM regressions 
All Firms (models 1 and 3a) 
Dependent:  
DLog (Employment) ALL PERIOD ALL PERIOD 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Explanatory Estimate p-value 
Investments 0.590 0.000*** DLog (Long-Term Debt) 0.006 0.5104 
Log (Total Assets) 0.013 0.000*** DLog (Total Assets) 0.765 0.0000*** 
Log (Leverage) 0.010 0.393 DLog (Ebit) -0.032 0.0273** 
Log (Pretax Earnings) -0.011 0.000*** Log (Bond) -0.019 0.0000*** 
Log (Bond) -0.023 0.000***   
 R2=0.98 DW=1.94 R2=0.96 DW=2.39 
Financial Institutions and Utilities excluded (models 2 and 3b) 
Dependent:  
DLog (Employment) ALL PERIOD ALL PERIOD 
Explanatory Estimate p-value Explanatory Estimate p-value 
Investments 0.192250 0.0000*** DLog (Long-Term Debt) 0.074 0.202 
Log (CapEx) -0.013594 0.5963 DLog (Total Assets) 0.587 0.011** 
Log (Leverage) 0.079799 0.1538 DLog (Ebit) 0.139 0.049** 
Log (Bond) -0.050188 0.0145** Log (Bond) -0.016 0.095* 
 R2=0.89 DW=1.76 R2=0.97 DW=2.83 
Levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The heteroscedasticity of the error terms is corrected 
by using White robust standard errors. 
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7  Conclusions 
The main contribution of this paper is that it critically extends the literature on the effects of 
external financing on employment on how, in particular, the issuance of a corporate bond of a 
firm affects its employment. We focus our research in Greece, because it is the country that was 
hit the hardest than any other EU member state during the economic crisis. In addition, we have 
made a thorough literature review and have collected all major studies in the literature on the 
effects of different factors on employment in a concise table.  
Our results indicate that in the cases where all firms are included in our models, corporate 
bonds have a small but negative effect on employment, while investment has a positive effect 
in all tested models in line with the literature. However, as suggested, it is better if we exclude 
from our sample financial institutions and utilities. In this case, in the recession period, it seems 
that Greek firms reduce their operational costs and manage to control their debt obligations, by 
issuing corporate bonds in order to repay or extend their loans. The effect is negative on 
employment in this case (model 2 and 3b). On the other hand, in the pre-crisis period (model 
3b), the effect on employment is positive. Greek firms increase their labor force, which means 
that they proceed on their investment choices. We support our findings with robustness checks. 
We must mention though that there are cases, in which Greek firms issue a bond (usually a 
syndicated loan1) to refinance existing loans and make short-term debt to long-term debt and 
this is not the case of an investment choice that could increase the labor force. We must have 
in mind that the financial position of the corporate sector may influence the performance of the 
real economy, the social cohesion and the stability of the financial system. Nevertheless, worth 
considering further is the difference among a large, medium or small firm that issues a bond. 
Any analysis should differ, as access to bond markets differs, since large firms can absorb fixed 
costs for accessing the corporate market, which is addressed mostly to medium and large 
healthy corporations. It should be very interesting to examine the Mid-Cap bond market and 
the effect on employment. Does Mid-Cap lack liquidity? Because smaller enterprises and start-
ups surely do, as they are unable to access bank funding because of their high-risk and size, 
waiting for business angels or a funds to support their projects. Furthermore, future researchers 
may want to investigate and test more variables such as Tobin’s q to control for growth 
opportunities, M&A dataset, credit ratings, bonds with longer maturity because they expected 
to have higher default risk, more firm’s specific characteristics such as (e.g. D/E ratio, R&D 
spending), or even test datasets of the EU Mediterranean countries, such as P.I.G.S. (Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, Spain). 
In conclusion, it should also be noted that the majority of corporate bonds are traded over-
the-counter (OTC) rather than stock exchanges. Non-financial firms are more open of using 
 
1 A corporate bond is covered by private and institutional investors of either a bank or a consortium of 
banks, hedge funds that work together to provide the loan and spread the risk of a borrower default, 
mainly to large value funds, and so-called syndicated loans. 
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capital-market-based financing, they are issuing high volumes of corporate debt to raise 
financing and often substitute bank loans by taking the advantage of the lowest bond yields in 
the last decade. Therefore, there is a lot of data that could be used to extend the research on the 
effect on employment of the corporate bond market. 
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